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The  ‘LEADER  community  initiatives’  and  the  ‘LEADER  approach’  have  been 
commonly accepted as an innovative way for development of rural areas in the EU. It is 
widely  assumed  that  promoting  growth  in  rural  areas  can  be  achieved  through 
partnerships between representatives of three classes of local actors: civil society, public 
administration and private/economic sector. While these partnerships certainly have the 
potential  to  improve  coordination  mechanisms  that  manage  local  resources,  their 
existence is likely to have an impact on the distribution of political advantages and future 
economic rents of current incumbents. What follows, it is reasonable to assume that local 
political elites may either block or impede the adoption of this institutional innovation. 
This paper investigates these issues using the Pilot Programme LEADER+ experiences in 
Poland.  The  focus  is  on  institutional  aspects  that  are  thought  to  affect  the  electoral 
process. Consistent with a large body of political economy literature, our results suggest 
that  LEADER-type  partnerships  are  more  likely  to  occur  in  an  environment  where 
holding politicians to account is easier.  
JEL classifications: D72, D78, H77, O18  
Keywords: political accountability, local government, rural development, Leader 
 
Introduction 
The issues of governance decentralisation and private-public partnerships have long been 
discussed and at the centre of policy experiments (see. e.g. Bardhan, 2002). One of the 
leading testing grounds is surely the European Union (EU), where the exercise of powers 
(at  different  levels:  (supra)national,  regional,  local)  is  regulated  by  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity.
1 A good example of combining a bottom-up approach and public-private 
partnerships  in  the  EU  is  LEADER  programme  which  is  designed  to  promote 
development of rural areas. The LEADER approach aims at encouraging (network-like) 
cooperation between representatives of three classes of local actors: civil society, public 
administration and private sector. Such partnerships, often referred to as Local Action 
Groups (LAGs), are then expected to define and implement local development strategies.  
The  key  argument  for  LEADER  is  often  that  it  allows  local  communities  to  more 
effectively  voice  their  needs.  Consequently,  it  is  argued  that  having  decision-making 
processes closer to people results in better coordination mechanism to harmonise interests 
and  solve  potential  conflicts.  Thanks  to  this,  the  LEADER  approach  is  expected  to 
achieve  an  improved  governance  in  rural  areas  leading  to  a  more  efficient  use  of 
                                                 
*The  author  would  like  to  thank  Barbara  Kucharska  and  Adam  Poślednik  from  the  Foundation  of 
Assistance Programmes for Agriculture (FAPA), Olga Siwiecka from the Centre for Economic Analyses of 
Public Sector and Sylwia Strzeżysz from the Polish Ministry of Agriculture for their help with collecting the 
data. 
1 See the Treaty of Maastricht and its amendments introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon (Art. 3b).  resources and a reduction in regional and social inequalities (Nemes and Fazekas, 2007; 
Pollermann et al., 2008).  
This approach has been widely advised and is certainly a promising tool to promote local 
development. However, there is evidence that not all rural areas in the EU are covered 
with  LEADER  measures.  For  example,  in  the  period  1991-1993  LEADER-type 
initiatives covered about 15% of the EU rural areas. While in the periods 1994-1999 and 
2000-2006 this proportion increased it was still lower than 50% and accounted for 42% 
and 47% respectively.
2 Moreover, the funding devoted for LEADER-type measures is 
relatively small in comparison to the EU rural development financial resources.
3 It is 
important then to gain better understanding of factors that determine the decision to adopt 
the LEADER approach.  
In a general debate accompanying the implementation of the LEADER approach, it is 
often raised that governance through partnerships may encounter several difficulties and 
consequently lead to considerable inefficiencies (see, for example, Jessop, 1999). Most 
often  one  points  to  temptation  of  abusing  power,  misusing  funds  or  excessive 
centralisation  (i.e.  a  situation  where  a  given  partnership  tries  to  supervise  all  local 
initiatives). In addition, one often mention conflicts between narrowly oriented projects 
and broader development strategy.  
Our  focus  is  different.  In  this  paper,  we  draw  inspiration  from  the  recent  political 
economy  literature  and  study  the  link  between  the  emergence  of  local  public-private 
partnerships  and  political  accountability.  The  idea  behind  this  is  as  follows.  The 
LEADER  approach  is  about  delegating  at  least  some  of  the  authority  from  a  local 
government  to  a  public-private  partnership.  This  shift  may  affect  the  distribution  of 
political power and thus erode the future rents of current incumbents. Therefore, local 
political elites will have an incentive to block such changes, notwithstanding the fact that 
they  may  benefit  the  local  community  as  a  whole  (see,  for  example,  Acemoglu  and 
Robinson, 2006; for a theoretical discussion of this argument). That said, this scenario 
could  be  mitigated  or  eliminated  if  political  elites  face  higher  accountability  to  their 
voters.  Officials  who  want  to  be  re-elected  must  act  sufficiently  often  in  the  voters’ 
interest. Therefore, as long as local community is well informed and individuals have the 
right to vote politicians out of office, the latter have incentives to do what the community 
wants  (Persson  and  Tabellini,  2000).  Consequently,  with  higher  degree  of  political 
accountability, local political elites should have lower incentives to oppose delegating 
decision-making processes closer to people.  
This  paper  aims  to  provide  evidence  on  this  relationship  focusing  on  the  hitherto 
LEADER experiences in Poland. Our unit of analysis is the smallest administrative unit 
                                                 
2 The data on rural areas in the EU (based on the OECD methodology) was taken from EC (2010). The data 
on the LEADER coverage on the other hand come from EC (2006a). For the period 1991-1993 the EU-12 
(without Austria, Finland and Sweden) was considered. For the periods 1994-1999 and 2000-2006, the 
data refer to the EU-15, the so-called ‘old Member States’.  
3 According to article 17 (2) of Council regulation 1698/2005, EU Member States are obliged to use 5% of 
the Community rural development financial resources for LEADER-type initiatives.  in Poland, a municipality (gmina).
4 This is the level, at which the decision to form/join 
the LEADER-type partnership is made. Poland seems to be particularly suitable for this 
kind of analysis for two key reasons. First, although there have been several projects in 
support of the LEADER-type approach prior to accession, a great majority of the existing 
partnerships were formed only since 2004, i.e. when Poland joined the EU and took 
advantage of the Pilot Programme Leader (PPL+) (Borek et al., 2006). What follows, this 
mode of operation is relatively new in Polish rural areas. It is interesting therefore to see 
to  what  extent  the  adoption  of  this  institutional  innovation  was  driven  by  political 
accountability in general, and factors thought to affect the electoral process in particular. 
Second,  Poland  provides  a  natural  testing  ground  as  it  is  characterised  by  important 
institutional differences at local level. Most importantly, some municipalities use first-
past-the-post and some use proportional electoral systems. Moreover, they differ from 
each other in terms of a size of a local government with regard to a number of seats 
awarded. What follows, one can test how do these different institutional arrangements 
affect the emergence of partnership modes of governance.  
Our  results  suggest  a  positive  impact  of  political  accountability  on  the  adoption  of 
LEADER-type measures. More specifically, LEADER initiatives have been implemented 
in municipalities with majoritarian rather than proportional electoral rules. This shows 
that local partnerships are created where people vote for individual candidates rather than 
for political parties, i.e. where political elites have stronger incentives  to please their 
electorate since they are based on their competences rather than on average competences 
of  their  parties.  We  also  find  that  local  public-private  partnerships  are  located  in 
municipalities  where  a  government  size  (in  terms  of  a  number  of  seats  awarded)  is 
smaller. Given that higher number of politicians in power makes it more difficult to link 
their individual actions with actual policy  outcomes, this again points to the fact that 
partnership  mode  of  governance  is  more  likely  in  municipalities  where  holding 
politicians to account for their actions is easier.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents briefly the relevant 
literature  and  discusses  how  political  accountability  may  affect  the  adoption  of  the 
LEADER approach. Section 3 provides some background discussion about the history of 
LEADER initiatives in Poland. Section 4 presents the data, whereas Section 5 discuses 
our empirical strategy and results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
Background 
The political economy literature has long recognised that voters respond to changes in the 
economy. As here it is not the place to develop any kind of survey of these studies, we 
refer the reader to Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and Besley (2006) for a comprehensive 
tour of the field.  
A  crucial  aspect  that  affects  the  relationship  between  politicians  and  electorate  is 
information that voters have about implemented policies and politicians’ actions. This 
information will determine the extent to which a conflict of interest between politicians 
and electorate can be solved. As long as voters can link the implemented policies with 
                                                 
4 According to the EU Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics the Polish gminas are classified as 
NUTS  5  regions.  For  more  on  this  classification  see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction  politicians’ actions, politicians can be held to account for what they do while being in 
office. Consequently, if their actions can be observed, they have stronger incentives to act 
in favour of voters’ preferences and a conflict of interest can be prevented. A specific 
class  of  models  which  are  very  well  suited  to  study  political  accountability  and  its 
consequences are political agency models, which are based on the assumption that voters 
condition their voting decision on incumbent behaviour (see, for example, Barro, 1973; 
Ferejohn, 1986).  
An  increasing  body  of  the  literature  studies  effects  of  political  accountability  by 
investigating the role of media in improving politicians’ actions and politics (Besley and 
Burgess,  2002;  Djankov  et  al.,  2003;  Stromberg,  2004).  However,  as  noted  in  many 
studies,  incentives  for  politicians’  behaviour  could  well  be  grounded  in  institutional 
underpinnings of political system (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini, 2000; 2003; 
or Cox, 2008; for a literature review). Moreover, the latter may also affect the voters’ 
information  on  actions  undertaken  by  current  incumbents  and  hence  determine  their 
voting behaviour. Of particular importance seem to be the rules that are thought to affect 
the electoral process. In this paper, we take a closer look at two of them, namely the fact 
whether votes are cast for individual candidates or for parties (lists of candidates) and the 
magnitude of electoral districts. It is important to note that in our case this is identical 
with the number of seats in local government. Below we briefly describe the theory that 
provides  the  link  between  electoral  rules  and  political  accountability.  The  presented 
discussion draws on Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Cox (2008).  
The first distinction that is worth making here is between the so-called majoritarian and 
proportional electoral systems. In the former, voters vote for an individual candidate and 
his/her electoral success is solely dependent on a number of his/her votes. In the latter 
system on the other hand, votes are casted for a list of candidates (most often for a party 
list). In this case, an electoral success of an individual candidate depends predominantly 
on  a  number  of  votes  for  the  whole  party  and  his/her  position  on  the  list.  These 
differences  between  the  two  systems  may  have  important  consequences  for  both 
politicians’ incentives to please their voters and the extent to which it is possible to link 
their actions to specific policy choices and outcomes. In general, accountability should be 
more  pronounced  under  majoritarian  elections.  The  reason  for  that  is  as  follows.  In 
majoritarian systems, voters can judge their current incumbent on the basis of his/her 
performance. What follows, during elections, a single agent can either be rewarded or 
punished for his/her effort. Under proportional elections, on the other hand, rewarding or 
blaming individuals is harder as votes are cast on the list of candidates. In effect, the 
accountability mechanism (e.g. voting poor politician out of office) cannot be used as 
effectively as under majoritarian elections. This has also an important consequence for 
the agency costs. Since satisfactory individual performance is not certain to guarantee an 
incumbent’s  reappointment,  his/her  incentives  to  perform  well  are  weakened.  What 
follows, under proportional elections rent seeking problem may be more intense.  
A  distinct  but  related  source  of  potential  inefficiency  in  accountability  mechanism  is 
linked to a number of seats in (local) government. Here, again, it is plausible to assume 
that the larger the number of incumbents the more difficult it might be for the voters to 
stay informed about the relationship between policy actions and outcomes, i.e. about who 
is responsible for what.  Below we aim at testing whether the above mentioned theories could account for the 
establishment pattern of LEADER-type partnerships in Poland. We argue that the role of 
political accountability in advocating this kind of measures could have been crucial as 
political  elites  had  incentives  to  oppose  it.  Our  idea  is  based  on  the  theoretical 
considerations developed, among others, by Acemoglu and Robinson (1999; 2006). It 
could be argued that the LEADER-approach to promote rural development, especially in 
new  Memeber  States,  could  be  regarded  as  an  institutional  innovation.  Its  adoption 
therefore, might affect the distribution of political and economic rents. What follows, 
current  incumbents  may  either  block  it  or  impede  it  as  their  future  rents  could  be 
endangered. This prediction finds some confirmation in qualitative findings coming from 
Knieć  (2009)  and  Furmankiewcz  et  al.  (2010).
5  Our  contribution  is  to  provide  some 
quantitative evidence on this account.  
To do so, we study the cross-municipality determinants of setting up local partnerships 
using data over 187 such partnerships and more than 2000 regions. Given the theoretical 
discussion  presented  above,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  establishing  local  public-
private partnerships should be more common in municipalities where holding politicians 
to account for their actions is easier. Therefore, we expect the probability of establishing 
the partnership to be higher in municipalities with majoritarian elections (as opposed to 
proportional  ones)  and  negatively  correlated  with  the  number  of  seats  in  local 
government. Before we move to our empirical strategy, we briefly describe the hitherto 
experiences of LEADER-type initiatives in Poland to build the context for our analysis. 
In what follows, also some more details on the organisation of local elections in Poland 
are provided.  
 
Leader programme in Poland 
The Leader programme has been introduced in Poland since May 2004 when the country 
joined the EU.
6 At that time Poland was one of the six new Member States that decided to 
implement LEADER type measures. During 2004-2006 period they were implemented 
under the Polish Agriculture and Rural Development Sectoral Operational Programme. 
These measures focused around two things. In the first phase (Scheme I), which was 
carried out from the end of 2004 till the end of 2006, the emphasis was put mainly on the 
acquisition of skills such as training and building local development partnerships (LAGs). 
In the second phase (Scheme II), which commenced in 2006, the selected partnerships 
started to fund projects under local development strategies.  
Selection of LAGs was hedged with several conditions. We mention here only those that 
we think are the most important given our focus. For a more comprehensive description 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that similar evidence, though still only qualitative, can be found for other countries as 
well. To our knowledge, it is best documented for the UK (see, for example, Edwards et al., 2000; or 
Pemberton and Goodwin, 2010).  
6 In the EU the LEADER programme started in 1991 with LEADER I. It continued with LEADER II (1994 – 
1999), and LEADER+ (2000 – 2006). In the current financial perspective (2007-2013) it has become an 
inherent part of the EU Rural Development Policy and some of the funding must support projects based 
on the LEADER approach. For the overview of the LEADER history see, for instance, European Commission 
(2006b).  see,  for  example,  Furmankiewicz  et  al.  (2010).  First,  the  LEADER  measures  were 
designed  only  for  rural  and  rural-urban  municipalities  without  towns  above  20,000 
inhabitants. Further, the density of population for the LEADER area was a maximum of 
150  inhabitants  per  km
2  and  the  total  population  leaving  in  the  area  within  which  a 
strategy was  supposed  to  be  carried out  had  to contain between  10,000  and  100,000 
inhabitants. Last but not least, at decision-making level the economic and social partners 
and civil society must have made up at least 50 % of the local partnership.  
The  Scheme  I  was  completed  with  the  selection  of  167  partnerships  (from  248 
applications submitted to the programme). In the Scheme II, there were 187 applications 
(155 from beneficiaries of the Scheme I) and 150 contracts were signed (Borek et al., 
2006).  
Our  study  focuses  on  the  second  scheme.  The reason  for  this  is  that  the  first  phase, 
although important for establishing partnerships, was not about implementation of local 
development strategies, which was the core only of the second scheme. What follows, it 
could be argued that this was mainly the latter phase that could influence decisions and 
thus disturb the balance of forces and potentially affect the distribution of future political 
and economic rents. We study the differences between municipalities that applied for 
funding and those that did not. We prefer to look at applied/not applied distinction rather 
than with/without funding since we believe that the decision to apply for funds could 
already be regarded as an indication of the existence of the partnership wishing to share 
the decision-making process and implement local development strategy. This choice also 
increases the number of the ‘treated’ municipalites, which might be important for the 
quality of our estimates. To confirm the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the 
impact  of  political  accountability  measures  on  the  LEADER  approach  on  the  sample 
restricted  to  those  partnerships  that  signed  the  contract  for  implementation  of  their 
integrated local strategies.  
 
Data 
We will estimate the effect of political accountability on the adoption of the LEADER 
approach  at  municipalities  level.  This  is  the  smallest  administrative  unit immediately 
under the Polish powiat (NUTS 4), sub-region (NUTS 3) and voivodship (NUTS 2)
7. In 
2006, Poland had 2478 municipalities, of which 1589 were rural, 582 were rural-urban 
and 307 were urban. Given that the eligibility criteria in LEADER programme excluded 
urban  municipalities,  we  focus  only  on  rural  and  rural-urban  municipalities.  After 
cleaning the dataset, 2148 observations were left for the analysis.    
Our analysis exploits data from three sources. First, data on municipalities that applied 
for funding under the Scheme  II of the PPL+  were obtained from the Foundation of 
Assistance Programmes for Agriculture which was the implementing authority of this 
measure. As the call for applications was announced on March 31, 2006 and closed on 
June 19, 2006, this data refer to 2006. Second, our key variables of interest, capturing 
different organisational aspects of elections, were based on data provided by the National 
Electoral Commission, which is in charge of supervising elections in Poland. These data 
refer to local elections that were held in 2002 and were the last elections before the 
                                                 
7  In  Poland,  there  are  379  powiats,  66  sub-regions  (before  2007  there  were  45  of  them)  and  16 
voivodships.  Scheme II was put in place.
8 Finally, information on municipalities’ demographic and 
economic characteristics come from the Municipium database. These data refer to 2006.  
Taking into account that a decision to form/join a local partnership is made at the lowest 
administrative  level,  a  municipality-level  analysis  presents  an  important  advantage. 
However, it has also an important cost. The main problem is that a number of socio-
economic variables available for this administrative level is very limited.
9 To address this 
problem, all our regressions include full set of regional dummies, either at the voivodship 
(16)  or  powiat  (379)  level.  Given  that  (local)  commercial  centres  are  localised 
predominantly in cities (most often in capitals of voivodships and/or powiats), this should 
help to mitigate, at least to some extent, the omitted variables problem. That said, the 
absence  of  data  on  a  number  of  socio-economic  indicators  at  municipality  level  is 
certainly a limitation of our analysis. We believe however, that it nonetheless provides a 
new  opportunity  to  understand  how  the  adoption  of  LEADER  approach  may  be 




As  noted  above,  in  order  to  investigate  the  impact  of  political  accountability  on  the 
adoption of the LEADER approach, we exploit the variation in electoral rules across the 
Polish  municipalities.  What  follows,  our  empirical  strategy  is  strictly  related  to 
characteristics of the electoral system governing the selection process of local authorities. 
There are three key cross-municipality institutional differences.
10 The line of division 
runs  between  municipalities  containing  less  and  more  than  20,000  inhabitants.  In 
municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants electoral formula is based on plurality 
rule; voters vote for specific candidates (casting as many votes as the number of seats to 
be awarded in a given district); and the number of seats per electoral district ranges from 
1 to 5. In contrast, in municipalities containing more than 20,000 inhabitants elections are 
organised according to proportionality rule; voters cast just one vote for a party list; and a 
number of seats per electoral district ranges from 5 to 8.  
With this description in hand, we now move to a detailed description of our econometric 
approach. Our basic specification to be estimated is a simple logit model of the following 
form: 
                                                 
8 The next elections were held in November 2006, i.e. already after the decision to apply had to be made.  
9 Most of the available data preceding the year 2006 concern higher administrative levels, i.e. powiats and 
voivodships. Some more data (e.g. on local government budget) is available only starting from 2006. 
While we run some regressions using also these data, their results need to be interpreted with care. That 
is because, they may suffer from the reverse causality problem. 
10 This part of the text is based on the ‘Local elections statute Act’ passed on July 16
th 1998 with later 
amendments  (Ordynacja wyborcza do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmików województw, Dz. U. Nr 95, poz. 
602 zm. Dz. U. z 1998 r. Nr 160, poz. 1060 Dz. U. z 2001 r. Nr 45, poz. 497 Dz. U. z 2001 r. Nr 89, poz. 971 
Dz. U. z 2002 r. Nr 23, poz. 220 Dz. U. z 2002 r. Nr 113, poz. 984 Dz. U. z 2002 r. Nr 127, poz. 1089). The 
text  (in  Polish),  unified  by  the  National  Electoral  Office,  can  be  accessed  here: 
http://www.pkw.gov.pl/katalog/artykul/17982.html ιi = βxi +  i + εi 
where ιi is a dummy equal to one if a municipality participates in a LEADER programme 
and equal to zero otherwise. xi is a vector of economic and political variables that we 
expect  to  influence  community’s  participation  decision.   i  is  a  full  set  of  regional 
dummies and εi is an error term capturing all other omitted factors. Importantly, vector xi 
contains variable capturing the effect of political accountability. Given the theoretical 
discussion presented above, in our analysis we use two variables aimed at capturing the 
effect of political accountability. On the one hand, we use a dummy variable equal to one 
for  municipalities with majoritarian  electoral  system  and  zero for  municipalities  with 
proportional systems. On the other hand, we use a variable denoting a number of seats 
awarded in each municipality. As these variables – by definition (see above) - are highly 
correlated (correlation coefficient equal to 0.93), we use them in different specifications 
to confirm the robustness of our results.  
Other covariates included in the vector xi are population and population density of a 
given  municipality.  The  former  variable  assures  that  the  impact  of  our  key  dummy 
(majoritarian vs. proportional) which distinguishes municipalities containing more than 
20,000 inhabitants does not capture the effect of larger population. The latter variable on 
the  other  hand,  is  included  given  the  fact  that  population  density  was  among  the 
requirements taken into account by the selection of LAGs. Both these variables enter the 
regressions  in  logs.  In  addition,  we  control  for  the  type  of  a  given  municipality  by 
including  a  dummy  equal  to  one  for  rural  municipalities  and  zero  for  rural-urban 
municipalities.  
Before we move to reporting our results, a word of comment is needed concerning the 
robustness  of  our  approach.  Typically,  the  cross-sectional  studies  concerned  with  the 
impact of institutions on policy choice face the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. As 
the institutional characteristics are likely to be endogenously determined, a fixed-effects 
or instrumental variables methods are preferable to simple cross-section OLS or logit 
models. That said, it should be stressed that we think Polish municipalities provide a 
natural experiment for looking at the impact of electoral rules and in our case the problem 
of  endogeneity  is  unlikely  to  appear.  In  effect,  using  less  sophisticated  econometric 
approach seems to be a plausible strategy. Our belief stems from the following reasons. 
First of all, the electoral system at municipalities’ level have been designed by the central 
government and not by local authorities. Consequently, it is not possible that local elites 
could have manipulated the rules of the electoral process. In addition, these rules have not 
changed over time (since 1999 when the administrative reform has been put in place in 
Poland) so they have not been specially  adjusted before the  LEADER-type measures 
were  potentially  available.  This  gives  further  credence  to  our  strategy.  Overall,  we 
believe  that  our  key  variables  of  interest  that  aim  to  capture  the  role  of  political 
accountability  are  strictly  exogenous.  What  follows,  their  implications  can  be 
investigated  simply  by  comparing  LEADER-type  partnerships’  occurrences  in 
municipalities with majoritarian and proportional electoral rules/with different number of 
seats awarded.  
Given the limited space, we present our results only in words.  The main message that 
arises  from  our  analysis  is  as  follows.  Establishing  LEADER-type  public-private 
partnerships  is  more  likely  in  municipalities  where  holding  politicians  to  account  is 
easier. This result is derived from the fact that LEADER-type initiatives are more likely to  appear  in  municipalities  with  majoritarian  rather  than  proportional  electoral  rules. 
Similar  conclusion  can  be  drawn  from  an  alternative  specification  where  political 
accountability is measured by a number of electoral seats awarded. This analysis suggests 
that LEADER-type initiatives are present in municipalities with lower number of seats. 
This again points to the fact that delegating power closer to people occurs more often 
where those holding politicians to account are more likely to have sufficient information 
about the politician’s action. To further confirm the robustness of our results, we also 
estimate this specification for the sub-sample of municipalities with majoritarian election 
rules. This is done since our two measures of political accountability are highly correlated 
with  the  number  of  seats  awarded  being  significantly  higher  under  the  proportional 
system.  It  could  be  argued  therefore,  that  our  variable  measuring  a  number  of  seats 
simply captures the difference between municipalities with majoritarian and proportional 
electoral  rules.  Our  results  however,  reject  this  hypothesis  and  our  variable  remains 
highly significant and negative also within the majoritarian sub-sample.  
 
Conclusions 
The LEADER-approach, which is based on establishing local public-private partnerships, 
has  become  a  widely  promoted  mode  of  rural  development  in  the  EU.  While  this 
approach has a potential to achieve improved governance in rural areas, there are reasons 
as to why such partnerships may not be established. The most important ones point to the 
fact,  that  delegating  (at  least  some)  authority  closer  to  people  is  likely  to  affect  the 
distribution of political and economic rents. Consequently, current incumbents may either 
block it or impede it. This paper studies the determinants of the establishment of such 
partnerships in Poland. Based on the recent findings of the political economy literature, 
the focus is on institutional aspects that are thought to affect the electoral process. The 
results are interpreted in relation to a theory that puts models of political accountability at 
the  front.  They  suggest  that  local  public-private  partnerships,  which  are  the  core  of 
LEADER-type initiatives, are positively correlated with measures capturing the effects of 
political  accountability.  More  specifically,  they  are  established  in  municipalities  with 
majoritarian rather than proportional election rules and lower number of seats in local 
government. Both these results indicate that LEADER-type measures are more likely to 
be adopted where holding politicians to account for their actions is easier. This is turn, is 
consistent with a large body of literature suggesting that politicians engage in pro-voters’ 
initiatives when the information about the relationship between politicians’ actions and 
policy outcomes is more transparent.  
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